The Tragedy of the Commons, Part II
Let’s be interesting about this.
In the previous post, I touched upon four of the eight most popular dilemmas propounded by the tragedy of the commons. The verdict of having only eight wasn’t intentional, but I figured it was enough. For what, I’m not exactly sure. Enough to disprove this game theory? No, with some questions answered, more are sure to be asked. Enough to serve as a guideline for solutions to be proposed in the future? Only time will tell. Might brevity have been the principle source? No, the last post is rather lengthy and this one is sure to be even longer.
Brace yourself anyway. I know almost exactly what I’m doing.
Blackmail
The penalization of blackmail has been called into question, not only in relation to the tragedy of the commons, but in its consistency with the non-aggression principle, in general.
Dr. Mary J. Ruwart, activist and extremely brilliant author of Healing Our World, does her best to answer this question by citing the private court system as a solution.
The criteria for illegality in a libertarian society would be: “Does it threaten first-strike force, fraud, or theft?” For example, if I pay blackmail to someone who would otherwise beat me, they are using the threat of first-strike force to take my money, very much like a thief does. This would clearly be against libertarian law. If I pay blackmail to someone so that they won’t tell a true but embarrassing tale about me, I am not being threatened with first-strike force, fraud, or theft. Quite possibly, such “blackmail” might (depending upon the circumstances) be considered a private contract under libertarian law. If the blackmailer told his or her story anyway, I might be able to sue for contract violation! If I pay blackmail to someone so that they won’t lie about me, the situation is not as clear. Many libertarians consider slander of a person’s reputation to be a violation of the non-aggression principle; others don’t.
A contractual agreement, this is usually, but not always. It is always, however, an exchange of services, the service in this case being the silence of the man menacingly holding a manila envelope between his index and middle fingers, but the exchange is not voluntary. Therefore, it is an act of extortion.
The expense is now an obligation one must consider for their own well-being, but the option to cease payment for the blackmailer’s silence is always available, much like the option for one to quit their job and live on the streets or become a liability on someone else’s dime as opposed to being employed is available. What separates man from beast in this scenario, however, is freedom of association. The employee makes the conscious decision to associate with his employer, whereas the blackmailer essentially approaches his victim and forces his way into, or further into his life with the intention of extorting money from him. The victim has no freedom and is caught in dire straits between taking a momentary blow to his finances or one that will haunt him to no end and is, thus initiating force and violating the non-aggression principle.
In the rare instances that blackmail is justified, there is usually an offense being undivulged, in which case, the person who has committed the act is paying for a crime they have previously committed and the blackmailer is capitalizing on their guilt. This is the free market and social Darwinism joining forces to punish wrongdoers who think that money buys exoneration and affluenza. Exposing the information is not a violation of the non-aggression principle if the act is deemed objectionable. In other words, Edward Snowden is not guilty as far as I’m concerned.
One could even argue that the private court system can practice blackmail. If, say, a business is sued for malfeasance, the business could be summoned for court via the threat of exposure of their misconduct from the person issuing the subpoena, or the court itself, lest they pay their dues to the plaintiff.
Ultimately, blackmail is how taxation would look if politicians had the temerity to directly take money from citizens. Sometimes, it’s extortion, other times, it’s restitution.
Lying
Suppose the blackmailer were to simply lie about the victim. As Ruwart observed, slander is considered a violation of non-aggression by some and not so by others and there is legitimacy to both arguments. On one hand, a free society would allow people to say whatever they want without intrusion from an external force. On another hand, though I wish to ignore this in my arguments, private courts will exist to settle such disputes.
It’s as simple as this. People will already be divided on issues. Freedom of the press and speech cannot exist without freedom of thought and elimination of government does not mean elimination of polarity. The vacuum left by politics will just be filled by economics. Free men have the right to believe what they want and take what they will from the media that surrounds them and since there are two sides to every argument, one of the arguments is bound to bear a falsehood.
Perception of belief is where we are conflicted. How many men can make the claim of racism before a man is officially branded a racist?
Slander does not violate the non-aggression principle, nor does libel, but neither does filing a lawsuit against people who perpetuate these lies. If it is successfully found that the slanderer is guilty of defamation, justice would be served. However, the public usually believes what they read if they deem the source reliable enough, and make the argument that the claims must be true, otherwise the accused would sue for libel. If we take the enforcement of natural law out of the equation, and thus, the ability to sue for libel, the likelihood of people trusting media that is likely to have libeled in the past, a source in its early stage of growth, or a source feuding with the accused, over the word of the accused, themselves is up in the air, but nonetheless highly unlikely.
Either defamation violates the NAP, or enforcement of natural law violates the NAP.
Sexual Harassment
[TRIGGER WARNING]:
Okay, now that the feminists are gone, we can correctly identify sexual harassment. It goes without saying that inappropriate physical contact is molestation, and therefore, an act of aggression. The case here is really one of instigation. Catcalling is not an act of aggression, but what of the yelling of racial slurs? The yelling of racial slurs, though not a physical act of aggression is by all rights, an act of hostility, in which case, retaliation would be justified. Catcalling, on the other hand, is not an act of aggression if compliments are all that are being given, and such actions are usually ignored. If catcalling evolves into groping on the commons, the person has been sexually assaulted and has a right to retaliate as they see fit. If it evolves into following, retaliation would also be justified. Following a stranger with one’s body, with which they could be raped is no different than following that same person with a gun, with which they can be shot.
Fraud
In a free society, there would be no social security cards or taxes, so that would help alleviate the problem of fraud, but the problem will still exist with credit card companies and banks having such a huge influence on the economy. In order for one to identify fraud with specificity, one must be familiar with an area’s policies regarding fraud.
Chapter 18 of the U.S. Penal Code, § 1001 states:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. If the matter relates to an offense under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or 117, or section 1591, then the term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall be not more than 8 years.
So, under the current system, fraudsters can be imprisoned, and credit card companies can alert their customers when fraudsters use their accounts and shut them down accordingly, but the code says nothing about the fraud victim being reimbursed by the credit card company, even in a system that initiates force against a person for committing a nonviolent, but deleterious act. The state enforces fraud as a crime because it is nanny state. It knows that people are irresponsible enough to use credit for that which is out of their budget. Should the state reimburse its citizens when they lose stock, as well? In a free society, there would be no enforcement of fraud, which would discourage people from using credit cards, as they shouldn’t. (This is the objectivist side of the nonaggression principle I hoped you wouldn’t have to see.)
For the same reason, forgery is likely not to be enforced, which would hopefully incentivize businesses to invest in electronic document management systems, which is unlikely, since occurrences of forgery are so rare, or under-reported, but a suggestion for avoiding lawsuits.
Conclusion
The tragedy of the commons has been in circulation since 1883, long before modern libertarian and anarcho-capitalist theory were even in their philosophical stages. What started as an economic game theory has evolved into a tediously parroted catch-22 that is used against anarchists to stump them during arguments, perhaps because they are unfamiliar with the evolution of our ideas since then. Unfortunately, this essay isn’t the be all, end all to lay this quandary to rest; as I have said, with some questions answered, more will be proposed, but a liberated mind knows better than to repeat what others say.
Think for yourself.