Does Steem have a Tragedy of the Commons dynamic?

in #economics3 years ago (edited)

What is the Tragedy of the Commons? How is it avoided? And why should the Steem ecosystem care?


Introduction

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In this essay, I will introduce a concept from economics, known as the Tragedy of the Commons. In short, the Tragedy of the Commons is a dysfunctional dynamic that emerges when profits are private but losses are shared. The concept was first described in the 1800s, and it received its name in 1968. Since that time, economists have studied the conditions that lead to this scenario, and also how to avoid it. In addition to introducing the concept, I'll also discuss a little bit about what has been learned about avoiding it.

Finally, I will argue that it is relevant to curation incentives in the Steem ecosystem. In particular, I suspect that the current generation of bidbots is caught up in a sort of Tragedy of the Commons dynamic. I will also do some brainstorming about how the Steem community might act to limit the negative impact of this phenomenon in our ecosystem.

Obviously, I'm not an economist, so this coverage is cursory and speculative. I especially welcome discussion from anyone with more of an economics background.

What is the "Tragedy of the Commons"

Imagine a group of ranchers who are sharing a common pasture for grazing their livestock. The pasture can sustain a certain number of animals, but if the herd size passes that point, the quality of the pasture goes down, and the herds start to suffer and die off. If there were just one rancher, that person would maintain their herd at the optimal size. However, when you add more ranchers into the mix, the rancher has to worry about what the other ranchers might do with their own herd sizes. In this case, each rancher increases their herd size as fast as possible so that they're sure to get the most value possible out of the common pasture before it inevitably collapses from overuse by the other ranchers.

In short, incentives when profits are held privately but losses are shared align themselves in a way that tends to produce a dysfunctional result. Here's a video that describes it in some more detail:


In his 1968 essay, The Tragedy of the Commons, Garrett Hardin described it like this:

Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit--in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.

Other examples of the Tragedy of the Commons include over-fishing, pollution, traffic jams on public highways, and hunting endangered wildlife to extinction.

Avoiding the Tragedy of the Commons

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The video above suggests three general techniques that can be used to avoid the Tragedy of the Commons:

  1. Affix property rights to public spaces
  2. Top-down regulation
  3. Bottom-up, trust-based collaboration

An example of the first type, affixing property rights to public spaces, would be to subdivide the shared resource into parcels and sell or lease usage rights to private individuals.

Examples of top-down regulation would include things like the Clean Water Act and other environmental regulations. Other examples include things like highway tolls or charging maintenance taxes and fees.

According to the video Elinor Ostrom, determined that bottom-up management of shared resources is successful when certain conditions are met:

  • It is easy to monitor resources and their use, and the information can be understood/verified at relatively low cost.
  • Rates of change are moderate for resources and user populations, as well as for economic, social, and technological considerations.
  • Communities maintain conditions that engender trust, including frequent personal communication, and dense social networks.
  • Outsiders can be easily excluded from using the resource.
  • Users of the shared resource support effective monitoring and rule enforcement.

What does this have to do with Steem?

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I suspect that the current generation of bidbots is caught up in a cycle that's something like the Tragedy of the Commons. The shared resource is the rewards pool, and of course the profits are derived privately by the bidbot owners, delegators, and the authors who make use of their service.

To be clear, I'm not opposed to voting bots, or even to bidbots. I think that they are absolutely necessary if Steem ever hopes to scale up and increase its user base by a factor of thousands or even tens of thousands.

In all, though, I think that the Steem curator - human or bot - has three main jobs for the blockchain:

  1. Distribute rewards to authors
  2. Generate curation rewards for voters
  3. Rank posts in order by their likelihood to attract human attention and/or engagement.

The first two goals have to do with the short-term interests of blockchain participants. The third, in my opinion, effects the price, so it is more relevant to longer term incentives.

To me, it seems fairly clear that the bidbots are accomplishing the first two goals above, but they are entirely failing at the third. Because they are failing at the third goal, I think that they are harmful to the price of Steem in the market place. If there is something like the Tragedy of the Commons going on here, this could be an existential threat to the Steem blockchain, as the price of the tokens might gradually follow a death spiral down to zero.

So, to me the question is, how can the Steem ecosystem encourage the emergence of a more sustainable type of bidbot? Let's look at all three of the possible techniques for avoiding the tragedy of the commons:

Type 1: Privatize

The only thing that comes to mind is to change the relative cost of resource credits. In a sense, the rewards pool already is privatized through the use of Steem Power and Resource Credits, but maybe some adjustment could encourage bidbots to align their votes with longer, instead of shorter, term goals?

Maybe as an account gets more SP, the corresponding number of resource credits should exhibit some sort of decay?

Type 2: Top-down regulation

I always hate posts that say, "Steemit should do this...", but the reality is that Steemit is the only stakeholder that could qualify as a top-down influencer. So, the question really is, "what should Steemit do - if anything?"

An idea that occurred to me is that Steemit could use the downvote as a sort-of a tax. The goal wouldn't be to eliminate the bidbot, but simply to add some friction to its use. To do this, they could pick a certain percentage of random bidbot-boosted posts as they approach payout time and issue a downvote to counterbalance the highest value upvote (or some other portion) on those posts.

As time goes on, the size and frequency of the downvotes could be adjusted in order to (hopefully) lead to a more sustainable use of bidbots.

An interesting dynamic about this is that it reverses the flow of incentives: the "loss" would be privatized, and when the rewards are returned to the rewards pool, the profits would be shared.

Type 3: Bottom-up collaboration

This is complicated, but I was encouraged to learn that we already see the emergence of features that could facilitate it. In particular, the launch of Steem's Communities was a step in the right direction. Also, we have an increase of people publishing statistics about how the blockchain is used. Regular transparency reports on bidbot activity could help the communities to shape incentives that lead bidbot owners and users to produce better voting results.

To me, the big stumbling block here is this one: "Outsiders can be excluded from using the resource at low cost.", but maybe this goes back to the resource credits in the first sub-section. Or maybe it's already met, since voters must stake Steem first.

Conclusion

If you're still reading, thank you for staying with me to this point. I hope that I have described the Tragedy of the Commons and some ways that economists have suggested for avoiding it. Additionally, I applied the concept to the Steem ecosystem, and suggested some possible ways that we can mitigate this problem (if it exists) in the Steem ecosystem. These are:

  • Changes to the resource credit allocation algorithm for Steem-Power holders
  • The use of downvotes by large stakeholders as a metaphorical "bidbot tax"
  • Working to develop decentralized methods for aligning incentives with long-term interests instead of short term interests.

As noted above, this is basically just brainstorming, so I'd be interested to hear other people's thoughts on the topic.


Thank you for your time and attention.

As a general rule, I up-vote comments that demonstrate "proof of reading".




Steve Palmer is an IT professional with three decades of professional experience in data communications and information systems. He holds a bachelor's degree in mathematics, a master's degree in computer science, and a master's degree in information systems and technology management. He has been awarded 3 US patents.

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I agree with @the-gorilla, the battle with bid bots has already been lost. We all eat one cake (reward pool). The more SP delegated to bid bots, the more cake is eaten by authors who use bid bots. Bloggers will soon be left with only crumbs. Only an increase in the price of STEEM can save bloggers, then their crumbs will still be worth something.

New generation of bid bots will be able to change the situation only if they offer even more favorable conditions, which is impossible.

We need a mechanism that would force people to abandon the use of bid bots. Imagine, I earn 4 thousand dollars a month with bid bots. @the-gorilla tells me, "Stop using bid bots because it's bad. You better write posts and get $ 300 a month." Of course I agree, why not :)

One easy way to solve all the problems is to eliminate the possibility of delegating STEEM to everyone.

Some interesting ideas which if implemented, I can see could successfully improve the Steemit ecosystem. A few thoughts that spring to mind are:

  1. I don't think Steemit will ever downvote again no matter how bad the situation on the blockchain gets. Which means we're reliant upon another user with enough clout to be able to clear out $100 worth of rewards which at the moment doesn't exist. @ac-cheetah has a good "downvoting trail" that could take up this mantle but it would require far greater backing than the 120,000 SP that it currently has.
  2. The idea of a "decay" in voting weight as users become more powerful is a great idea. But - the 1st generation bidbots won't change so any 2nd generation bots would work until users reach the "optimal" point and then users would move back to the original voting bot. Or just use both - users of TipU, etc. buy votes from every service going.
  3. The ranking of posts by something other than payout is something that I'm particularly interested in and something that I'm hoping to implement in my new front end. Primarily ranking posts by comments and quality of comments as an indicator to their quality.

There are times though when I feel that Steemit is already past the tipping point of where it can be saved. I'm sure I've said this before - 75% of all power owned by the top 1,000 users (i.e. most users with 10,000+ SP) is delegated. Mostly to voting bots. Unless these 1,000 users change their behaviour (which is unlikely), the battle's already lost.

Last night, @cmp2020 was showing me an AI course that he purchased from udemy for his AI curation project. One of the courses I saw on his screen reminded me of this part of your comment:

The ranking of posts by something other than payout is something that I'm particularly interested in and something that I'm hoping to implement in my new front end. Primarily ranking posts by comments and quality of comments as an indicator to their quality.

It was: Recommender Systems and Deep Learning in Python

Maybe that'll eventually be useful for you, or maybe you can find some free references on the topic by searching for "Recommender Systems". That's the first time I had seen them named that way.

On this:

There are times though when I feel that Steemit is already past the tipping point of where it can be saved. I'm sure I've said this before - 75% of all power owned by the top 1,000 users (i.e. most users with 10,000+ SP) is delegated. Mostly to voting bots. Unless these 1,000 users change their behaviour (which is unlikely), the battle's already lost.

I don't think a tipping point has been crossed, but with the size of some of the bidbots, I'm getting concerned that one might be approaching. For Steemit's stake, I'm aware of somewhere around 38M SP. One of the bidbots is controlling somewhere around 32M. Unless Steemit is controlling some stake that I'm not aware of, it seems like we're getting close to a point where even Steemit would need to leverage a decentralized solution.

Thanks for the links - I'll take a look when I find some time 🙂

o1eh occassionally shares some statistics on the use of bidbots which I find interesting. He's got combined bidbots having more than double the power of Steemit although I don't know if he includes mister-delegation or the steemit account within this.

I don't expect Steemit to ever ban the likes of UpVu through fear that the 30+ million Steem delegated to them will leave the platform. If Steem is to remain a purely "blogging" currency, then I think that our best hope is to have a front-end that makes these things disappear so that new users don't know that they exist and don't continue to make them more powerful. And accept that they're there, draining the reward pool and propping up the price.

I don't expect Steemit to ever ban the likes of UpVu through fear that the 30+ million Steem delegated to them will leave the platform.

I agree on this. I don't really want to see them banned, anyway. I'd just like to see them encouraged to get better at curating. You're probably right that if no one's going to challenge them, and there are no relevant competitors, the best approach is to just make them less prominent in the front ends.

I hope the developers of this panel read your post , you are always trying to improve the panel , it should give you additional incentives , my opinion to everything you say is : the curators should be entirely human , many of the posts contain feelings of the authors and only a human perceives them , another issue and I have already mentioned to you is the monopoly , in many communities it exists and it is quite notorious , so I am one of the common people , I try to work constantly and slowly increase my profits , but if the panel it continues so lateral, it may not attract people too much, it is my humble opinion

To be clear, I'm not opposed to voting bots, or even to bidbots. I think that they are absolutely necessary if Steem ever hopes to scale up and increase its user base by a factor of thousands or even tens of thousands.

Would you mind expanding on this? Some voting bots make sense to me, such auto-voting for particular creators acting like a subscription or Patreon-style arrangment, but I can't really think of a justification for bidbots, and I really don't follow the connection to scaling up.

Well, a bidbot like we have today, I agree with this:

Some voting bots make sense to me, such auto-voting for particular creators acting like a subscription or Patreon-style arrangment, but I can't really think of a justification for bidbots

It needs to be much more sophisticated than, "payment (or delegation) comes in -> vote goes out"

But what if they did some sort of quality assurance? For example, let's say a bot accepted bids for a period of two hours, ranked the posts that people had submitted, and then distributed votes based on that ranking so that the average vote stayed the same, but better posts got bigger votes and worse posts got smaller votes, and authors of posts below some quality threshold get a refund?

That's just off the top of my head, I'm sure other strategies are also possible.

Of course, it would never be perfect, but neither is human voting. I think bidbots serve at least two useful purposes:

  1. They provide passive rewards for an investor who wants to just park their investment for 20 years and then forget about it.
  2. They give content creators a tool to increase their visibility.

I think of it basically like advertising and SEO in the traditional Internet space.

But what if they did some sort of quality assurance? For example, let's say a bot accepted bids for a period of two hours, ranked the posts that people had submitted, and then distributed votes based on that ranking so that the average vote stayed the same, but better posts got bigger votes and worse posts got smaller votes, and authors of posts below some quality threshold get a refund?

Maybe? But I think the externality of the chain seeming like a scammy, scummy pay-to-play place is what is usually not priced in.

They provide passive rewards for an investor who wants to just park their investment for 20 years and then forget about it.

As a heuristic I think it makes sense to start from a skeptical POV any time there's passive income happening. It seems more likely to be exploitative rent-seeking than productive economic activity to me. Plus SP holders already get interest just for holding SP. The bid-bots also get curation rewards. It seems like there's some double- or triple-dipping going on. I suspect bid-botting (at least in the mindless pay->vote style) contributes to price changes being purely inflationary.

They give content creators a tool to increase their visibility.

That's the rationalization I've heard, but I don't think I buy it. (Also, the chain is supposed to already have a "promotion" feature that isn't used by the frontends, if we really want this we should use that rather than bidbots mucking with post rewards). If this is what people really want to buy, though, maybe the bidbots should just remove their votes at day 6, after the work of putting something on trending has been done. That way everybody is happy. (Prediction: Not everybody would be happy, the people are paying for the rewards not the visibility).

So, just to be clear, I'm not arguing for bidbots as they exist today. For the current generation, I agree with most of your points above. I just think that it's possible to have "new and improved" bidbot that also protects/grows the value of STEEM so that it's delivered product wouldn't look scammy/spammy.

Maybe bid bots are not strictly "necessary" for scaling, but basically, we have three options:

  • Live with the current generation of bidbots
  • Come up with a way to encourage them to get better via one of the three general methods above (privatize costs through code changes, top-down action, decentralized efforts)
  • Try to eliminate them

Of the three, I think the second option is the most realistic path for strengthening the STEEM ecosystem. Not mentioned above, there's also the possibility that a new/better bidbot just emerges and outcompetes the others, but if there's something like the Tragedy of the Commons is going on, incentives might prevent that from happening.

On this point,

It seems more likely to be exploitative rent-seeking than productive economic activity to me.

I generally agree that passive income might be a signal for skepticism/scrutiny, but I also think that many passive income strategies have been useful/valuable, so (to me), it's not a very firm rule of thumb. High-value investors are going to want to maximize their returns. There has to be a sustainable way for them to accomplish that, or they'll choose the unsustainable ways.

( Also, the chain is supposed to already have a "promotion" feature that isn't used by the frontends, if we really want this we should use that rather than bidbots mucking with post rewards )

Yeah, it's a shame that the influential curators and developers didn't choose to support the promoted posts usage when that capability was working. At this point, it doesn't even seem to be working at the blockchain level. I'm not sure how/when that happened.

High-value investors are going to want to maximize their returns. There has to be a sustainable way for them to accomplish that, or they'll choose the unsustainable ways.

I wonder if there's sort of a "If you owe the bank $100, that's your problem. If you owe the bank $100 million, that's the bank's problem." kind of situation here. I think the original vision of the blockchain was premised on the idea that having an ownership stake in the chain would incentivize you to try to improve the ecosystem. I think that Steemit Inc. has mostly tried to act that way (although not always successfully), while it seems like smaller large stakeholders are more inclined toward the "make it worth my while to keep my value locked up" mindset. Whales have a credible threat of being able to leave, Steemit Inc. can't realistically sell a huge amount without the price tanking so they are more incentivized toward the "make the ecosystem succeed" strategy.

I think the core of the problem is that being able to direct rewards to creators you like is supposed to be the value proposition of holding SP. But if there aren't creators you like here then you can't get that value. It's also kind of a "long spoon" kind of situation -- an overly financialized way of looking at SP may cause people to want to bend the system so they can feed themselves rather than feeding others the way it's supposed to work.

Both are good analogies. I think Steemit is trying to work around the first problem with the club5050/club75/club100, and I believe that's having a positive impact on powering up. But a potential problem with that is that when people build to a certain point, a percentage are likely to "defect" to the camp of the "smaller large stakeholders" that you describe.

I think the core of the problem is that being able to direct rewards to creators you like is supposed to be the value proposition of holding SP. But if there aren't creators you like here then you can't get that value.

This may be right. Maybe solving this would go a long way towards realigning incentives in a healthier way.

One of the things that JS suggested when he first bought Steemit was to bring in some influencers, which might have helped with that challenge. Of course, SteemExclusive content would be best, but even just making some agreements to mirror twitter/medium/substack content from some influencers might help with that. For an example of that (regardless of political opinions) just look at how well Trump's mirrored content does on some of the platforms that host it.

In the simplest case, I have wondered for a while why JS and the Tron Foundation don't post here first and then mirror to Twitter and Medium, or at least mirror their content here. (off topic, but there's probably even a psychological impact on the market from the fact that those accounts' Steemit wallets are basically empty.)

I suspect the way the split went down, and the way that the Hive side seemed to get the better of the PR war (at least in English-speaking media) has left Steem in sort of a "benign neglect" state. It's probably not worth it to JS or Tron to make an effort to be associated with Steem when they potentially have a pool of committed, social-media-savvy enemies waiting to pounce.

I go back and forth on that. I'm mostly inclined to agree, but there are some things that make me wonder. Among other things, someone must have spent a lot to plug the TRX rewards into Steem; and also, Steem could still be a nice complement to their other properties. Connecting Steem with embedded DLive videos and BTFS for image storage could be a force multiplier for all three. In reverse, Steem could also carry comments in the Dlive app to provide extra rewards on the DLive platform. There is a lot of untapped potential there. It's just hard to guess from outside.

And back to the bidbot topic, this is interesting: [SteemPunks] The 1st Generative NFTs are coming to Steem!.

So on one hand, upvu is subsidizing all this vacuous content on the chain, but on the other hand, they are also innovating. On one hand, this seems good, but on the other hand, I suspect it's going to subsidize even more vacuous posting.

I definitely agree in part that there is a tragedy of the commons. I find bots problematic since, as their name implies, are automatic. I don't know how they should be "regulated", if at all, but they are certainly a nuisance

As I noted in the post, I'm not opposed to bots, in general. Also, they're basically unavoidable on a permissionless blockchain, so (IMO) the best we can do is try to figure out the best "division of labor" between bots and humans.

The thing that really puzzles me about today's bidbots is why competition doesn't seem to be forcing them to improve. It seems like we've been stuck on generation 1 for some years now.

Most bid-bots have delegations. The vote value of authorized (delegated) accounts / bots can be reduced by 50%. For example, let's say a regular user can vote for $1 with 10,000 SP. With delegation, another user with 10,000 SP can be arranged to vote for 0.5$.