*Long Read* Discourse on the freedom of the will: To what extent did Erasmus and Luther understand each other?

*This is an essay I wrote at university detailing the differences in thought and theology between humanist philosopher Desiderius Erasmus and Protestant reformer Martin Luther. I have given a brief explanation at the start of the piece outlining their major differences on the subject of human free will but if this is not clear do comment and I will endeavor to explain in further detail. I believe the real use of this essay in relation to modern political discourse - especially online and on social media - lies in sociologist Max Weber's value rationalities. Over the course of the text I explain how both men were so fundamentally opposed to one another to render meaningful debate impossible. In rereading this essay I cant help but think of online discussions which devolve into the hurling of invective and reductive name-calling because the interlocutors don't recognise, identify or understand the fundamental value rationalities held by the other. People will always disagree on matters of political policy, but moving past the trivial matters and seeing someone's fundamental world view may be the start to a higher standard of debate. Maybe.*

   After much initial reticence, Desiderius Erasmus finally penned his riposte against the bête noire of the Catholic Church, the theologian and reformer Martin Luther. Entitled ‘Diatribe sue collation de libero arbitrio’ (1524), Erasmus refuted the latter’s doctrine of salvation through faith alone, and proffered instead the power of the human will to affect its own salvation. To this Luther replied in kind with a treatise on ‘De servo abritrio’ (1525), a tract which he himself believed to be the best and most complete exposition of his theology. The respective titles of their works, coupled with the fact that they were writing explicitly in response to one another, is evidence enough for their differing conclusions concerning man’s own power in relation to the grace of God. The most salient aspects of their thought will be elucidated in brief below, but a comparative analysis of the differences in their respective doctrines will not form the main impetus of this essay. Instead, through a close textual analysis, these dissimilarities will be construed as symptomatic of a deeper lack of understanding between the two men. Max Weber’s concept of value and instrumental rationalities will be applied to elucidate this dissonance. Value rationalities are notions impervious to reason, accepted instead for their intrinsic value. Whilst their instrumental rationalities were clearly in opposition to one another, it was their differing value rationalities that constituted the main barrier to understanding, rendering their arguments mutually unintelligible. Not only did they disagree, but they often failed to understand each other at all. 

 As a preface to discussion, the main theological arguments of each party will be outlined to provide context. For Martin Luther, free will was a mere illusion. The human will was bound inextricably to sin, and as such humans could do nothing but sin. Salvation therefore was not based upon good works accomplished in one’s lifetime, as no human work was intrinsically good. It was instead a gift from God, attainable through faith in the sacrifice of Jesus Christ. Those upon whom God imparted His grace were saved, with the rest of humanity consigned to the spiritual scrapheap. Conversely, Erasmus retained the primacy of grace to salvation but imparted an element to human volition. Humans were able to accept or reject God’s grace, and whilst the will was disposed towards sin, it could be recalibrated towards the good through God’s help. Temporal morality and worthy deeds had a part to play in salvation as manifestations of this human will, not free in its entirety, but definitely afforded a degree of liberty. Erasmus opposed Luther’s pre-destination, and his theology of salvation is a synergy between the work of man and the grace of God, with the undoubted superiority of the latter.[1]

 The most enduring source of tension that underlay the discourse between Luther and Erasmus was the former’s unremitting quest to seek the ultimate truth, juxtaposed with the latter’s preoccupation with concord and expediency. In assuming that Lutheran doctrine would gain traction amongst the populace, Erasmus notes that the conspicuous absence of the role of good works in the path to salvation would discourage moral behaviour. “(People) tend towards unbelief, wickedness, and blasphemy. There is no sense in pouring oil on the fire” (Erasmus, Luther and Winter, I; 8). The veracity of Luther’s assertions are not called into question, rather their application is not deemed expedient in light of the human condition. Erasmus tacitly accepts the notion that Luther could be correct in his assertions, but maintains that “certain kinds of truth which, even though they could be known, would nonetheless be unwisely offered for indiscriminate consideration. (I; 7). This renders the two men mutually unintelligible to the other; even if Erasmus were to concede to his adversary on doctrinal grounds, he would resist in preaching the Lutheran creed by virtue of its pernicious effects on society and undermining of established patterns of moral conduct.

 Erasmus maintains that Christian doctrine in this instance should be adapted to suit the needs of the populace, a view held in contempt by Luther, who upholds that all doctrine should transcend historical time and place. (II; 94) When tasked with refuting the claim that justification though faith alone would engender moral stupor, Luther in fact replies in the affirmative. “And as to your fear that many depraved persons will abuse this liberty, this must be considered […] the evil we must endure” (II; 95). Luther does not assuage the concerns of Erasmus, to the contrary he confirms them, but notes that the loss of harmony and discord in the temporal sphere is a small price to pay for salvation in the spiritual realm (II;93). Note that it is not the consequence to which Luther objects, but the relative importance to which he accords to it in his own schema. In contrast to the harmony espoused by Erasmus, Luther steadfastly adheres to preaching the truth at any and all cost, even if “the whole world should […] be thrown into turmoil and fighting” (II; 94). Luther and Erasmus are able to understand each other’s arguments in the abstract, but they are unable to truly actualize the opposing view. Erasmus concedes that justification through faith alone could well be the path of salvation, and yet still would not support the Lutheran movement. Luther himself lamentably notes the adverse effects that an amoral conception of salvation could have on society, but relegates this below the veracity of the gospel. It would be antithetical to Luther to value the temporal over the spiritual akin to Erasmus. What is demonstrated here is the clash in value rationalities of the two men, precluding a true understanding. Both men could countenance and engage with the instrumental rationalities of the other with which they were faced, yet their value rationalities remained incompatible. Erasmus values concord over truth, for Luther it was the converse. 

 A recurring theme in Erasmus’ protestations against the bondage of the will and the determinism of the Lutheran universe is his concern over the negation of the human spirit and soul, and the subjugation of man to a mere creature whom the Lord controls at whim. Erasmus juxtaposes the relationship of mankind to God, where will and grace act cooperatively, with the relationship between an axe and a craftsmen, where the axe is a passive entity, possessing no volition of its own (V; 49). Erasmus posits that without an agency, we are analogous to a tool or a device, inanimate objects without a purpose to our temporal lives. This was offensive to Erasmus’ humanitas, the esteem in which he held human nature and its capacity for greatness.[2] For Luther to allay the anxiety aroused in Erasmus when faced with the complete bondage of the will, he consciously utilises the same metaphor. “But we are so seized as a saw or an axe is handled by a carpenter” (IV; 108). This is illustrative of the mutual intelligibility between the two men. Luther has employed the same analogy untampered and complete, attaining a comfort from the complete submission of his will to the Lord where Erasmus finds only grief. Luther explains how the doctrine of faith alone brought him relief, curing his neurosis on whether he had laboured and strived enough to please God that had afflicted him during his years as a friar (VI; 117). Although Erasmus’ desire to possess a form of autonomy and agency is so ingrained in modern Western individualism so as to seem natural, we have to extricate ourselves from our own social milieu and see this idea it for what it is – an assumption that all men desire to control their own fate – and an assumption to which Luther does not share. Erasmus concludes his treatise returning to the issue of Lutheranism reducing man to object. “I answer, what’s the good of the entire man, if God treats him […] as he can deal with a pebble?” (VIII; 79) This holds no sway with his opponent. Put simply, one cannot argue against those who see the fortunes of a rock as preferential to those of man with a free will. 

 One aspect upon which Luther and Erasmus do agree is the use of scripture, since the application of Biblical quotes to support one’s position adds an irrefutable gravitas to an argument. Whilst both devote ample time to the analysis and interpretation of the Gospel, their approaches are so distinct that a common ground cannot be reached. The discordance between their value rationalities is evinced in their perspective upon figurative interpretations of scripture, and the notion of the Holy Spirit acting through the reader in Bible exegesis. Erasmus asserts that “Holy scripture is in most instances either obscure and figurative” and this necessitates that at times one “recedes from the literal meaning” (VIII; 80). An important weapon in Erasmus’ arsenal, figurative reading facilitated a form of intellectual flexibility in interpreting scripture that had ostensibly seemed to contradict one’s argument. However, Luther cannot countenance the notion of scripture’s obscurity, and thus there is no room for any interpretation other that the literal. He contends that any opacity is the fault of hermeneutics, not an indictment on the subject matter but a sign that the reader does not possess the Holy Spirit. “But it is not surprising that those reading without the spirit are tossed like a reed with every wind” (I; 86). This again is an assumption to which logic cannot readily be applied. Luther’s believes the Holy Spirit acts upon him, and therefore to any opponent he has a template riposte – the Spirit does not act through you. Erasmus too concedes that the gift of the Holy Spirit may be a requisite in Biblical interpretation, but asks as to whom, if anyone, possesses it, and how would one in fact prove its possession (II; 14). Here we have in microcosm a symptom of some of the fundamental differences between the two men. Running through Erasmus’ theology is an aversion to assertion, the rejection of polemics and dogmatism in favour of moderation and nuance (I; 5). He countenances the necessity of the Holy Spirit in exegesis but does not claim to have it, and doubts its working through anyone, whereas Luther steadfastly believes himself to be conduit for the divine, hence precluding any need to resort to a figurative interpretation. An unyielding devotion to a singular cause was antithetical to Erasmus, whereas it forms the basis of true Christian belief for Luther. In the words of the latter “Take away assertions and you take away Christianity” (II; 89). 

For the final section, it would be useful to elucidate the disjuncture between the value systems of the two men in question through an examination of Erasmus’ incomplete grasp, in parts, of Luther’s work. Hitherto there has been a discussion of misunderstandings predicated upon exchanges in which the antagonistic view is deemed so alien to one’s terrestrial thought it cannot ever be truly assimilated, as opposed to those in which one interlocutor simply fails to accurately ascertain the other’s argument. It is to the latter we turn to now.  Erasmus applied his intellect in order to refute the notions of pre-determinism and the necessity of action, but this is in an area in which he fails to fully grasp the Lutheran position, and as such his own arguments carry little weight with his opponent. Erasmus laments the iniquity between the damned and the saved in Lutheran thought, predetermined without recourse to any rational or objective criteria. By attributing a limited role to the will and the power of human volition, Erasmus tries to imbue a greater sense of impartiality to salvation, open to those who with God’s grace embraced the capacity to reform (I; 6). Moreover, he attempts to unpack the complicated relationship between sin, the subjugated will and necessity in the Lutheran conception. He proffers the notion that man is only truly capable of sinning if he has free will to choose his course of action, that which Luther has denied him. If we however accept that sin is a manifestation of God’s will upon man and is acted out of necessity, Erasmus queries “why should I suffer punishment for something that is not in my power to change?” (VIII; 71). In Erasmus’s specious understanding of Lutheran belief, God thus appears malevolent, damning those who carry out his will when they possess no freedom to alter their course or affect their destiny. “In so much as man can never be the author of good works, he can also never be called the author of evil ones. This opinion seems obviously to attribute cruelty and injustice to God” (VIII; 75).  Whilst this seems a rational and reasoned response to modern sentiments, there is a failure to understand Luther’s perspective. Thus Erasmus’ arguments, for all their eloquence and lucidity, fall upon death ears. To the charge of iniquity Luther embraces openly with no rebuttal “You say, by our doctrine a floodgate of iniquity is opened. Be it so” (II; 96), and to the notion of an evil God promotes in His place the corruption and weakness of man, tainted by sin. “since (humans) are perverted and evil, being carried along by that motion of divine omnipotence, they cannot but do what is perverse and evil”. (V; 112) For Luther, sinning has no relation to free will, we sin because it is our nature to sin. As for the divine power, it is itself good, but can only act with the material at hand. Far be it from Luther to question the benevolence and omnipotence of God, who merely acts through evil instruments. It is not God who is evil, as Erasmus had tentatively explored, but man. The notions of whether man is inherently good or is merely a slave to sin are in opposition here, as well as their relative concerns over that which is deemed to be unfair. Erasmus’ argument displays a rhetorical flair that belies a misreading of his adversary. 

In conclusion, whilst the respective theological deductions of Desiderius Erasmus and Martin Luther contradicted the other, their counters and rebuttals often fell upon deaf ears, holding no weight with the opposing side. This can be attributed to the clash of Weberian value rationalities in the two men. The value that both men placed upon doctrinal truth in relation to expediency, and their views upon the innate capacity of humanity were opposed, in addition to their differing notions on the lucidity of scripture and the perception of iniquity as unjust. To veer momentarily into the vernacular, Erasmus and Luther were incapable of seeing eye to eye. The collision of their value rationalities rendered their theology to be mutually unintelligible, precluding any effective understanding.
 

  [1] For a lucid summary of the two sides see Rupp, E. Gordon & Philip S. Watson., Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation (Westminster Press, 1969), pp 12-28   [2] R.A Faber, ‘Humanitas as Discriminating Factor in the Educational Writings of Erasmus and Luther’ in Dutch Review of Church History. Vol 85:1 (2005), p27