Locke on God as an Innate Idea

Locke, in his work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, engages with a view presented in Descartes’ meditations. As stated in the beginning of I.iv.12, Locke addresses the core argument that propels God as an innate idea into discussion.

A:

“Indeed, it is urged, that it is suitable to the goodness of God, to imprint upon the minds of men characters and notions of himself, and not to leave them in the dark and doubt in so grand a concernment” (I.iv.12)

Locke attributes the main motivation for God as an innate idea to the generally perceived goodness of God. The thought is that if God is ultimately good, then God must have instilled in us an innate idea of him - as that would be the best way for us to understand.

Although Locke gives several arguments to further his view that our idea of God is not innate, he specifically retaliates to the point laid out above.

B:

“God having endued man with those faculties of knowledge which he hath, was no more obliged by his goodness to plant those innate notions in his mind, than that, having given him reason, hands, and materials, he should build him bridges or houses ...” (I.iv.12)

Locke diffuses the nativist claim. Instead of attacking the idea that God is compelled by his goodness, Locke simply reframes the situation. After all, if God has given us all the tools to have as good of an idea of him as can be had, then God is still in line with maximal goodness.

This interaction can be reconstructed as follows:

1. God is compelled to maximize goodness.
2. We are given an innate idea of God (from 1)
3. The tools that God gave us are sufficient to have an idea of God
4. [~2] Maximum goodness does not require us to have an innate idea of God (from 3)

Choosing argument B over the others requires justification. As arguments tend to rely on their context for accurate interpretation, it should be necessary to compare this argument with the others presented in Locke’s text.

When reading over I.iv.7-17, Locke’s objections attack the universal agreement of the existence of God. Locke states this most succinctly in I.iv.9, where he explains that “... had all mankind everywhere a notion of a God … it would not from thence follow, that the idea of him was innate." I would’ve picked this as the best argument - because I think it attacks our only way of discerning our idea of God in the first place - if it weren’t for the way it was presented. Locke denies each allusion to a human instance of innate knowledge in turn. Had he encapsulated these ideas dynamically, I would’ve been more inclined to choose this as his best argument.

Another reason for choosing B, is that it addresses the natural next step to take as a nativist. After exhausting empirical explanations, advocates of God as an innate idea are cornered into metaphysical discourse. The discussion naturally recedes to the contention between A and B, acting as the last refuge of the nativist. As a result, the debate revolving around God’s goodness as the reason for our innate idea of him rises to prevalent concern.

Just like any argument in Philosophy, Locke’s argument isn’t immune to objections. For one, the nativist could just stomp his foot on the ground. He could say that the way Locke reframed the situation does not encompass as much goodness as the opposing view. In more practical terms, this could manifest itself as a complaint towards having to gain a conception of God through the senses. Rebuttals like “wouldn’t it be better to have the idea to begin with than to have to work for it” and “removing our idea of God by another degree certainly doesn’t seem as good as having it to begin with” spring to mind.

Secondly, and more importantly, to talk in terms of God being compelled by a goal state of goodness requires a non-negligible personification of God. Although this objection applies to both the nativist and Locke, I think he’s required to justify why he plays along with the idea. To take for granted that God’s value judgments match our goals and desires is too optimistic. We require further justification to talk in these terms.

One can lose sight of why Locke deems this important in the first place. Locke’s argument against nativism pushes the view that there are no innate principles. To do so, he relies on the premise that there are no innate ideas. His aim is to support this claim by attacking God as an innate idea. After all, “... it is hard to conceive how there should be innate moral principles, without an innate idea of a Deity”. So it’s important for Locke to show that there’s no innate idea of God to make his network of arguments fall into place.

As B disturbs the nativist’s footing, the question of how we attain an idea of God requires a different explanation. How does Locke think we in fact come to acquire the idea of God? Locke sees our idea of God as complex - an aggregation of simple ideas. By compounding simple ideas and expanding them to infinities, we establish a complex conception of god. As he says, “... the complex ideas we have ... of God ... are made of the simple ideas we receive from reflection ...” and “... having, from what we experiment in ourselves, … we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity; and so putting them together, make our complex idea of God” (II.xxiii.33).

As mentioned at the start of this paper, Locke’s side of this discussion engages with views set out by Descartes in his meditations. The role of God in Descartes’ Meditations provides justification for innate ideas. God provides these characteristics within us. That is how we can have an innate idea of him. And as we have an innate idea of God, he can and does give us other innate ideas.

Under Locke’s view, we are given the tools instead, but not the ideas. As discussed in B, these tools are sufficient for us to interact with the world in such a way that the ideas that God wants us to have are necessarily attained. This is important for Locke because it supports his empiricist view. If it’s true that there are innate ideas, then there could be knowledge that cannot be obtained or verified through our senses - consequently ripping Empiricism apart.

As a result, God plays a less important role in Locke’s Essay than in Descartes's Meditations. This seems true in part because Locke sets out to promote his Empiricist view, which sets God aside to some degree. At the same time, Descartes use of God is so aggressive that it’s impossible to put Locke in the same boat. Where Locke tries to give explanations independent of God, Descartes plays his holy trump card to lighten the philosophical load.

It way be helpful to string the above moves together as they cover several aspects of Locke’s view on the innate idea of God. First, I lay out what I perceive to be the most motivating argument in favor of God as an innate idea (A). Then I present Locke’s counter argument to that view along with possible objections (B) - namely that an innate idea of God is not necessitated by God’s goodness. I furthermore justify why I consider the diffusal of the nativist’s argument more important than the arguments that employ empirical evidence to further Locke’s view. Then I outline Locke’s view on how we acquire the idea of God and why it’s important for Locke to show that we don’t have an innate idea of God. Finally, I contrast the role of God in Descartes’ Meditations and Locke’s Essay to conclude this interaction between texts.

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